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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/702,236	11/05/2003	Donald Hetzel	SENS0002	7940
22862	7590	01/09/2007	EXAMINER	
GLENN PATENT GROUP 3475 EDISON WAY, SUITE L MENLO PARK, CA 94025			SIMS, JASON M	
ART UNIT		PAPER NUMBER		
				1631
SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD OF RESPONSE	MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE		
3 MONTHS	01/09/2007	PAPER		

**Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.**

If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire 6 MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.

<b>Office Action Summary</b>	<b>Application No.</b>	<b>Applicant(s)</b>
	10/702,236	HETZEL ET AL.
	<b>Examiner</b>	<b>Art Unit</b>
	Jason M. Sims	1631

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

#### Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

#### Status

- 1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 11 October 2006.
- 2a) This action is FINAL.                            2b) This action is non-final.
- 3) Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

#### Disposition of Claims

- 4) Claim(s) 1-6,8-17,21-26 and 28-33 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) Claim(s) 1-6,8-17,21-26 and 28-33 is/are rejected.
- 7) Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

#### Application Papers

- 9) The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) accepted or b) objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

#### Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) All    b) Some \* c) None of:
  1. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
  3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

#### Attachment(s)

1) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)	4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s)/Mail Date: _____
2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)	5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application
3) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)/Mail Date <u>10/11/2006</u>	6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____

### **DETAILED ACTION**

Applicant's arguments, filed 10/11/2006, have been fully considered but they are not deemed to be persuasive. Rejections and/or objections not reiterated from previous office actions are hereby withdrawn. The following rejections and/or objections are either reiterated or newly applied. They constitute the complete set presently being applied to the instant application.

Applicants have amended their claims, filed 10/11/2006, and therefore rejections newly made in the instant office action have been necessitated by amendment and applicants reasoning that the amendments were made for reasons other than patentability is not persuasive.

Applicant has cancelled claims 7, 18-20, and 27 and added new claims 28-33 in their reply filed 10/11/2006.

Claims 1-6, 8-17, 21-26, 28-33 are the current claims hereby under examination.

#### ***Minor Informality***

It has been noted that the referenced serial no: 10/207,236 is on applicant's responses filed 10/11/2006, but appears to be responses for case no: 10/702,236. Appropriate correction should be made in order to clarify the record.

#### ***Specification***

The disclosure is objected to because it contains an embedded hyperlink and/or other form of browser-executable code on page 4, first paragraph of the specification.

Applicant is required to delete the embedded hyperlink and/or other form of browser-executable code. See MPEP § 608.01.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101***

35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

Claims 1-6, 8-17, 21-22, and 29-33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.

Under the Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility (published in the O.G. notice (1300 OG 142) on 11/22/2005) a method that does not result in a physical transformation of matter MAY be statutory where it recites a concrete, tangible and useful result; i.e. a practical application.

Claims 1-6, 8-17, 21-22, and 29-33 are drawn to a process. A statutory process must include a step of a physical transformation, or produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result (State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc. CAFC 47 USPQ2d 1596 (1998), AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc. (CAFC 50 USPQ2d 1447 (1999)). In the instant claims, there is no step of physical transformation, thus the Examiner must determine if the instant claims include a useful, concrete, and tangible result.

As noted in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc. CAFC 47 USPQ2d 1596 (1998) below, the statutory category of the claimed subject matter is not relevant to a determination of whether the claimed subject matter produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result:

The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on *which* of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to 9--process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter--but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility. Section 101 specifies that statutory subject matter must also satisfy the other "conditions and requirements" of Title 35, including novelty, nonobviousness, and adequacy of disclosure and notice. See *In re Warmerdam*, 33 F.3d 1354, 1359, 31 USPQ2d 1754, 1757-58 (Fed. Cir. 1994). For purpose of our analysis, as noted above, claim 1 is directed to a machine programmed with the Hub and Spoke software and admittedly produces a "useful, concrete, and tangible result." *Alappat*, 33 F.3d at 1544, 31 USPQ2d at 1557. This renders it statutory subject matter, even if the useful result is expressed in numbers, such as price, profit, percentage, cost, or loss.

In determining if the claimed subject matter produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result, the Examiner must determine each standard individually. For a claim to be "useful," the claim must produce a result that is specific, and substantial. For a claim to be "concrete," the process must have a result that is reproducible. For a claim to be "tangible," the process must produce a real world result. Furthermore, the claim must be limited only to statutory embodiments.

Claims 1-6, 8-17, 21-22, and 29-33 do not produce a tangible result. A tangible result requires that the claim must set forth a practical application to produce a real-world result. This rejection could be overcome by amendment of the claims to recite that

a result of the method is outputted to a display or a memory or another computer on a network, or outputting the result to a user, or by including a physical transformation.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112***

The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter, which the applicant regards as his invention.

Claims 1-6, 8-17, 21-26, 28-33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

Claim 1 in lines 11-12 states "wherein said state of glucose metabolism disorder comprises any of:" and then lists those states which comprise the state of glucose metabolism disorder. One of the possible states of glucose metabolism disorder listed is a "normal" state. If "normal" does not refer to a state free from a state of glucose metabolism disorder, then it is vague and unclear as to what state "normal" refers or what the phrase "state of glucose metabolism disorder" refers.

Claim 1 in line 14 lists "pre-diabetic" as a state of glucose metabolism disorder. It is vague and unclear as to what is meant by this state and how it differs from a state that might be considered "normal" or "diabetic."

Claims 2-6, 8-17, 21-26, and 28-33 are rejected as being dependent from a rejected claim.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102***

The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.

(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or on an international application by another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.

The changes made to 35 U.S.C. 102(e) by the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) and the Intellectual Property and High Technology Technical Amendments Act of 2002 do not apply when the reference is a U.S. patent resulting directly or indirectly from an international application filed before November 29, 2000. Therefore, the prior art date of the reference is determined under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) prior to the amendment by the AIPA (pre-AIPA 35 U.S.C. 102(e)).

Claims 1-6 and 8-13, 16, and 21-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) as being anticipated by Kalatz et al. (US P/N 6925393).

Claims are drawn to a method for screening a subject for disorders of glucose metabolism, comprising measuring a glucose concentration profile, said glucose concentration profile comprising a plurality of blood glucose concentrations from at least after a glucose or meal challenge; generating a screening factor, wherein said screening factor comprises a mathematical representation of at least a plurality of glucose concentrations within said glucose concentration profile, wherein said screening factor is uniquely associated with a state of glucose metabolism disorder and classifying

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the subject into one of said states of glucose metabolism disorder based on evaluation of said screening factor.

Claims 1, 2, 5, and 22 are taught by Kalatz et al. in the Abstract, in Fig. 3, and at col. 3, lines 66-67 and col. 4, lines 1-19, col. 7, lines 65-67, and col. 8, lines 1-8. Kalatz et al. in the Abstract teaches measuring a glucose profile, which comprises a time series and evaluating the profile according to at least one profile. Kalatz et al. further teaches at Fig. 3, generating a curve for representing a plurality of glucose concentrations, which reads on a mathematical representation of at least a plurality of glucose concentrations within said glucose concentration profile. Kalatz et al. further teaches at col. 7, lines 65-67 and col. 8, lines 1-8, the use of such a screening factor for determining the state of the subject, which may be in a normal range or outside of the normal range, which reads on using a screening factor for determining a state of glucose metabolism disorder of a subject comprised of the state of "normal." Kalatz et al. at col. 4, lines 5-9, discusses hypo and hyperglycemia as predetermined classes where a subject would be classified as cited by the claims. Kalatz et al. teaches, in Fig. 3, parts of claim 5 wherein a parameter includes area under the curve and over a defined period of time along with a maximum glucose concentration and glucose concentration after elapse of a predetermined time interval.

Claim 3, is taught by Kalatz et al. at col.7, lines 43-45, where Kalatz discusses actual values of blood glucose concentrations.

Claims 4, 8, and 9 are taught by Kalatz et al. at col. 7, lines 22-42. Kalatz et al. discusses how glucose values are proportionate, or relative as cited in the claim, to insulin amounts and are calculated accordingly on a linear scale.

Claim 6 is taught by Kalatz et al. at col. 3, lines 66-67, col. 4, lines 1-19, col. 7, lines 65-67, and col. 8, lines 1-21. Kalatz et al. discusses a range of normal values and outside this range calls for a warning signal to the subject as being in an abnormal condition. The administration of insulin discussed by Kalatz et al. is indicative of a subject who is diabetic.

Claims 10-13, 16, and 25-27 are taught by Kalatz et al. at col. 9, lines 5-67 and col. 10, lines 1-20. Claim 25 comprises several alternative limitations, such as a noninvasive, minimally invasive, and invasive blood glucose analyzer. Kalatz et al. teaches a minimally and invasive blood glucose analyzer.

Claim 21 is taught by Kalatz et al. at col. 3, lines 66-67 and col. 4, lines 1-19.

Claims 23-24 are taught by Kalatz et al. at col. 8, lines 9-21 and col. 10, lines 15-20. Kalatz et al. discusses advising the subject of screening results through a display which advises the subject on the amount of insulin to administer and allowing the patient to control the concentration levels.

Thus, Kalatz et al. anticipates claims 1-13, 16, 21-27.

Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) as being anticipated by Otvos et al. (US P/N 6,518,069).

Claims are drawn to a method for screening a subject for disorders of glucose metabolism, comprising measuring a glucose concentration profile, said glucose concentration profile comprising a plurality of blood glucose concentrations from at least after a glucose or meal challenge; generating a screening factor, wherein said screening factor comprises a mathematical representation of at least a plurality of glucose concentrations within said glucose concentration profile, wherein said screening factor is uniquely associated with a state of glucose metabolism disorder and classifying the subject into one of said states of glucose metabolism disorder based on evaluation of said screening factor.

Otvos et al. teaches claims 1-6, 16, 22, 23 at the abstract, Fig. 1, Fig. 2, col. 2, lines 45-50 and lines 55-65, and at col. 4, lines 12-35. Otvos et al. describes deriving a reference spectrum from NMR for a known glucose concentration sample, which reads on measuring a glucose concentration profile. Otvos et al. further describes obtaining a patient blood sample and determining the glucose concentration, which inherently the blood sample is taken at some point after a glucose or meal challenge, which the claims are broadly interpreted as meaning at any point after a glucose or meal challenge. Otvos et al. teaches deriving a NMR data set from the blood sample that is used to evaluate the blood sample for screening for diabetes, which reads on generating a screening factor that is a mathematical representation of at least a plurality of glucose concentrations within said glucose profile and is uniquely associated with a state of glucose metabolism disorder and classifying the subject into one of said states of glucose metabolism disorder on evaluation of said screening factor. Otvos et al. at col.

4, teaches blood glucose concentrations comprise a time series, are actual values, relative values, and wherein said screening factor is generated using a parameter, wherein said parameter includes maximum glucose concentrations and an area under the curve of the glucose profile as in Fig. 1. Otvos et al. also describes classifying by comparing said screening factor with a corresponding predetermined value and/or a range of values indicative of either a normal condition or one of a plurality of abnormal conditions. Otvos et al. teaches at col. 4, lines 18-23 using referenced coefficients for actual or relative values when generating an evaluation factor, which reads on a screening factor that uses actual or relative values for parameters and weights.

Otvos et al. teaches claim 28 at the abstract. Otvos et al. teaches obtaining blood glucose concentrations by way of NMR, which reads on a noninvasive blood glucose analyzer.

Otvos et al. teaches claim 23 and 24 at col. 15, lines 25-33. Otvos et al. teaches generating a report that includes all the screening information and results and discusses throughout the specification of the results being given to the doctor, who will inherently advise the patient on the screening results and health risks.

Otvos et al. teaches claim 29, 30, and 32 at Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. Otvos et al. teaches the screening factors, which are NMR values, which show numerical values and representations of a shape of said glucose concentration profiles by the shape of the graphs.

The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

Claim 25 is being rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kalatz as applied to claims 1-13, 16, and 21-27 above, and further in view of Proniewicz et al. (US P/N 6853854).

Claim 25 is directed to methods for obtaining glucose values wherein the method comprises a noninvasive analyzer.

Kalatz does not specifically teach a noninvasive analyzer for obtaining glucose values, but does teach the other limitations of a minimally and invasive blood glucose analyzer.

Proniewicz et al., at col. 2, lines 1-67, teaches using a noninvasive analyzer for obtaining glucose values and describes its advantage to reducing the possibility of infection and unseemly scarring, which are some of the risks involved in blood withdrawal.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the instant application to combine the methods for obtaining and evaluating glucose profiles taught by Kalatz et al. with obtaining glucose values noninvasively as taught by Proniewicz et al. because it is a procedure that has been desirable to have and would be obviously more favorable to many patients who may benefit from this technology by reducing the risk for infection and unseemly scarring.

***Provisional Obviousness Type Double Patenting***

The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., *In re Berg*, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with this application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement.

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

An obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but an examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined claim is either anticipated by, or would be obvious over, the reference claim(s). see, e.g., *In re Berg*, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

Claim 1 is provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 8, of copending Application No. 10/702710, which anticipates claim 1 of the instant application. Although the conflicting

claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because claim 8 of copending application No. 10/702710 is a species of claim 1 of the instant application. For example, step 1 of both claims measure a glucose profile. Claim 8 of copending application No. 10/702710, step 1, is a species of step 1 of the instant application because it does not state measuring a glucose profile, but states measuring at least a portion of a glucose profile, but it also is comprised of the identical limitation found in step 1 of the instant application, wherein the portion is comprised of a plurality of blood glucose values as is the limitation of measuring a glucose profile of step 1 of claim 1 in the instant patent application. In addition, step 2 of claim 8 of copending application No. 10/702710 comprises extracting features from said at least portion of said profile and using the features for classifying a subject's state of glucose metabolism comprising determining classification of the subject to a particular disorder of glucose metabolism wherein it defines extracting features of the glucose profile as comprising any mathematical transformation that aids in the classification of the subject, which reads on the step 2 limitation of claim 1 in the instant patent application, which comprises a mathematical representation that is a generated screening factor. Step 2 of the instant patent application also has the limitation of classifying the subject into a state of glucose metabolism disorder.

This is a provisional obviousness-type double patenting rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

***Response to Arguments***

Applicant has argued that the current amendment clarifying a useful result should overcome the rejection made under 35 U.S.C 101.

This is not persuasive because the rejection made under 35 U.S.C. 101 was because the rejected claims do not site a tangible result as reiterated and stated above in the instant office action.

Applicant has argued that the recent amendments filed 10/11/2006 distinguishes the instant invention over the prior art.

This is not persuasive as the amendments filed 10/11/2006 have not overcome the prior art rejections as stated above and have necessitated a new grounds of rejection citing new art as stated above in the instant office action.

Applicant argues that Kalatz et al. does not generate a screening factor.

This is not persuasive as Kalatz et al. at Fig. 3, describes a screening factor, which is a curve, used in an evaluation process, which is a mathematical representation of at least a plurality of glucose concentrations within said glucose concentration profile.

Applicant also argues that the screening factor is not associated with a state of glucose metabolism disorder.

This is not persuasive because Kalatz et al. at col. 7, lines 65-67 and col. 8, lines 1-8 teaches how this screening factor is used to classify a subjects current state either being in a normal range or out of the normal range, which reads on one of the possible states of glucose metabolism disorder.

Applicant argues that in view of the amendments claim 25 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 is overcome.

This is not persuasive as argued above in the instant office action.

Applicant argues that claim 1 is no longer coextensive in scope with that of Claim 1 of the copending patent application 10/702,710 because of the amendments.

The Double Patenting rejection has been withdrawn and a new Obviousness Type Double Patenting rejection has been added due to the differences in scope of the 2 claims, which has been necessitated by amendment.

Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.

***Conclusion***

No claim is allowed

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Jason Sims, whose telephone number is (571)-272-7540.

If attempts to reach the Examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the Examiner's supervisor, Andrew Wang can be reached via telephone (571)-272-0811.

Papers related to this application may be submitted to Technical Center 1600 by facsimile transmission. Papers should be faxed to Technical Center 1600 via the Central PTO Fax Center. The faxing of such papers must conform with the notices published in the Official Gazette, 1096 OG 30 (November 15, 1988), 1156 OG 61 (November 16, 1993), and 1157 OG 94 (December 28, 1993) (See 37 CFR § 1.6(d)). The Central PTO Fax Center number is (571)-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

// Jason Sims //

*John S. Brusca 4 January 2007*  
JOHN S. BRUSCA, PH.D  
PRIMARY EXAMINER